{
 "_doc": "One result as verifycorelabs.com prints it: the headline, the problem and the buyer cut (never reworded) from the lab's plain-English account of the result, the one figure a buyer is shown and its limit, and the lab's current claim and limits verbatim, copied at the commit named in source. A field is left out, never reworded, when it uses a word this site keeps for its own process or names a file this site does not serve (not_reprinted).",
 "slug": "proof-of-deletion",
 "company": "AxiomLimit",
 "order": 10,
 "rank": 10,
 "served_receipt": "inference-limits/results/proof-of-deletion.json",
 "lab_file_older": false,
 "headline": [
  "the lab wrote two checkers for a \"deletion receipt\" (a signed note saying the data was destroyed) and, on a small setup built over an ordinary shared file rather than an AI serving system, showed six concrete ways such a receipt can check out while the data is still recoverable or was never deleted"
 ],
 "qualification": [
  "including one where both of its checkers accept a receipt from a colluding auditor when nothing was erased"
 ],
 "why": [
  "Services that hold customer data, such as cached AI conversation state, are asked to prove they deleted it, and a receipt that only proves a key was destroyed is easily mistaken for proof that the data is gone."
 ],
 "buyer": [
  "AI inference and cloud providers that must show customers or regulators that data was deleted, and the auditors who check them"
 ],
 "figure": "the campaign publishes six demonstrated limits",
 "figure_from": "claim",
 "limit": "SIM-ONLY over an mmap file",
 "limit_from": "lab scope",
 "plain": "six concrete ways",
 "quotes": {},
 "not_reprinted": [
  "claim",
  "limits"
 ],
 "prior_work": [
  {
   "title": "Deleting Secret Data with Public Verifiability",
   "by": "Feng Hao, Dylan Clarke, Avelino Francisco Zorzo, IACR ePrint 2014/364 (listed as IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Computing, DOI 10.1109/TDSC.2015.2423684)",
   "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/364.pdf"
  },
  {
   "title": "Secure Code Update for Embedded Devices via Proofs of Secure Erasure",
   "by": "Daniele Perito, Gene Tsudik, IACR ePrint 2010/217, 2010 (the ePrint entry says \"Published elsewhere\"; the Springer LNCS chapter is behind a login and was not opened)",
   "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/217.pdf"
  },
  {
   "title": "Message-Locked Encryption and Secure Deduplication",
   "by": "Mihir Bellare, Sriram Keelveedhi, Thomas Ristenpart, IACR ePrint 2012/631 (EUROCRYPT 2013)",
   "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/631"
  }
 ],
 "source": {
  "claims_file": "registry/CLAIMS_CURRENT.jsonl",
  "claims_sha256": "81776df15a1498abec7228ea179c952d01c54e031ffd4144498a30660963074b",
  "ranking_file": "views/VALUE_RANKING.md",
  "ranking_sha256": "2e980e26178b34dc49ec1d365f966be292f57d7c636143fc62c12feab72ae470",
  "dossier_sha256": "ca5832bf49bc7fe1357484f63db4a436a2087e6e90b692ca7b0168e6c622b9c6",
  "commit": "25d755d2f06518b632c3658ae83f20312daac53e"
 }
}