{
 "_doc": "One result as verifycorelabs.com prints it: the headline, the problem and the buyer cut (never reworded) from the lab's plain-English account of the result, the one figure a buyer is shown and its limit, and the lab's current claim and limits verbatim, copied at the commit named in source. A field is left out, never reworded, when it uses a word this site keeps for its own process or names a file this site does not serve (not_reprinted).",
 "slug": "reticle-certificate",
 "company": "ChipletOS",
 "order": null,
 "rank": 45,
 "served_receipt": "computational-lithography/results/succinct-reticle-certificate.json",
 "lab_file_older": false,
 "headline": [
  "A way to fold the pass/fail records for every small piece of a chip-printing stencil (photomask) into one summary record of about 1.35 kilobytes that stays that size whether the stencil is split into 64 pieces or about a million, plus a short checking program that uses only standard built-in libraries"
 ],
 "qualification": [
  "though the summary record on its own proves nothing, and assurance comes only from opening a number of spot-checked pieces that grows with how small a chance of missing a bad piece the checker wants"
 ],
 "why": [
  "Handing someone a sign-off record for a whole photomask built from per-piece records means handing over something that grows with the number of pieces",
  "but constant-size commitments over many records are standard since hash trees"
 ],
 "buyer": [
  "mask-synthesis and mask-data-preparation tool vendors and foundry sign-off teams that exchange sign-off records."
 ],
 "figure": "stay 1,347-1,379 bytes across 64 to 1,048,576 tiles",
 "figure_from": "claim",
 "limit": "Certificate SIZE is O(1) in tile count; certificate ASSURANCE is not.",
 "limit_from": "lab scope",
 "quotes": {
  "assurance": "Compact commitment is not compact assurance."
 },
 "claim": "Fold-annotated certificates compose tile to reticle and stay 1,347-1,379 bytes across 64 to 1,048,576 tiles, checkable by a verifier importing only hashlib, hmac, json and math.",
 "limits": "Compact commitment is not compact assurance. A disclosed section-102 novelty risk exists against Miller, Hicks, Katz and Shi, 'Authenticated Data Structures, Generically' (POPL 2014); the self-caught odd-arity duplication defect is Bitcoin CVE-2012-2459, public since 2012. Residual novelty is the domain observation that the four admission legs form a monoid under (AND, max, union-sum) -- frame the family around that, not the tree. Three fixed defects travel with it, including a false ADMIT this verifier once accepted. The measured compression is 7.934x (839 B against 6,657 B); the chiplet CLI separately PRINTS a compression_ratio of 7.9 that is a hardcoded literal and not a measurement.",
 "not_reprinted": [],
 "prior_work": [
  {
   "title": "Authenticated Data Structures, Generically",
   "by": "Andrew Miller, Michael Hicks, Jonathan Katz, Elaine Shi, ACM POPL, January 2014",
   "url": "https://www.cs.umd.edu/~mwh/papers/miller14gpads.html"
  },
  {
   "title": "merkle-sum-tree-ts (README)",
   "by": "summa-dev, GitHub repository, n.d.",
   "url": "https://github.com/summa-dev/merkle-sum-tree-ts"
  },
  {
   "title": "Merkle tree vulnerabilities",
   "by": "Bitcoin Optech, topic page, n.d.",
   "url": "https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/merkle-tree-vulnerabilities/"
  }
 ],
 "source": {
  "claims_file": "registry/CLAIMS_CURRENT.jsonl",
  "claims_sha256": "81776df15a1498abec7228ea179c952d01c54e031ffd4144498a30660963074b",
  "ranking_file": "views/VALUE_RANKING.md",
  "ranking_sha256": "2e980e26178b34dc49ec1d365f966be292f57d7c636143fc62c12feab72ae470",
  "dossier_sha256": "6987f6f7a60c8fe33915e0c11ea246b33a0c1866fda9bf37021050268d8755d3",
  "commit": "25d755d2f06518b632c3658ae83f20312daac53e"
 }
}