VerifyCore Labs · for diligence
Proof, IP and disclosures
Everything a technical reviewer needs to check the results on the home page: how each result’s own check works, a verifier that checks in your browser that a result file’s fingerprint matches the one this site lists, the open artifacts, the patent claims drafted for each company, and the disclosures that qualify every figure.
For diligence
How each result’s own check works
Each result on this site has a check written by the lab that re-reads or re-runs its evidence. Below, for each one: what the check does, how the lab tried to make it fail, and what that means for a buyer. No outside firm has audited any of them.
A fast coupling model, graded by outside solvers
- The graders, FastCap and Palace, are programs the lab did not write; the lab ran them itself, against a baseline it defined.
- The lab’s own check was run against a deliberately broken copy and failed as it should.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- That test could not be run for this result, because the program found no number in the claim that it could change.
- In a clean copy of the code the Palace step fails because the solver is not where the check looks.
What it means for a buyer. The graders, FastCap and Palace, are programs the lab did not write; the lab ran them itself, against a baseline it defined, so a buyer would want to repeat the grading on their own installation of both programs.
Fixed-size memory for reordering AI network data
- The lab’s own check recomputes the larger headline ratio from the saved results of the simulated grid and failed as it should when one measured cell was doubled.
- It does not re-run the simulation, so a wrong simulator would still pass it, and the figure against STrack is checked only to two decimal places.
- Every number comes from the lab’s own simulator, and nobody outside the lab has checked any of it.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- That test could not be run for this result, because the program found no number in the claim that it could change.
- The lab also ran adversarial tests against the design, which it calls an “escape sweep”; STrack, the published design the main figure is measured against, was left out of that sweep by name until 2026-08-19.
- The lab says it did not move its thresholds (its pass marks) to fit STrack.
What it means for a buyer. Every number comes from the lab’s own network simulator, and nobody outside the lab has checked it. The lab’s check recomputes the larger headline ratio from the saved simulation results (the figure against STrack is checked to two decimal places), so it would catch a mis-copied figure but not a wrong simulator; a buyer would want to re-run the simulation, or measure on hardware.
Checked brightness ranges for chip prints
- The lab’s own check confirms that its saved results file is unchanged and still carries the claim’s figures.
- It failed as it should when a claimed figure was changed, but it does not re-run the simulation.
- No outside tool or party has checked the result.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted, because the lab’s saved record of it no longer matches its signature (the stored mark that shows a file has not been altered).
What it means for a buyer. Every number is relative to the lab’s own imaging simulation, and no outside tool or party has checked it. The lab’s check confirms that the saved results still carry the claimed figures but does not re-run the simulation, so a buyer would want to re-run it on their own imaging model.
Crash recovery for AI assistants’ multi-step changes
- The check is the lab’s own script for this result.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The check caught the change and failed, as it should.
- That separate program is still inside the lab’s own programme, and the test world, the test scenarios and the crash points are the lab’s own.
- So this shows that the check can fail; it is not an outside grading of the recovery layer.
What it means for a buyer. The lab showed that its crash check can fail: when a separate program changed a number the check reads, the check caught it. The test world, the scenarios and the crash points are the lab’s own, and no outside party has graded the layer, so a buyer would want to run it against their own tools.
The capacitance flat models leave out
- The lab’s own check compares its solver with shapes whose exact answers are known and, when FastCap is installed, with FastCap; if FastCap is missing, the check skips that step instead of failing.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change the figure the claim quotes, in a file that sits outside the claim’s own evidence.
- The check caught the change and failed, as it should.
- But the lab’s own list of which figures its checks read shows that no check in its codebase reads this claim’s headline figure.
- So the test shows that a check can fail when a figure is changed; it does not show that the headline figure itself is guarded.
What it means for a buyer. The lab’s solver was checked against shapes with exact answers and against FastCap, an outside solver, run on the lab’s own mesh. No automated check in the lab’s code recomputes the headline share on each run, so treat it as a measurement reported once.
An Ultra Ethernet recovery design, proved in a model
- Four checking tools (a solver, a breadth-first search and two model checkers) each confirm the property on the lab’s one model, and the standard’s own sentence is what the model encodes.
- But all four check the lab’s single encoding, so a modelling mistake would pass all four together.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted, because the lab’s saved record of it no longer matches its signature (the stored mark that shows a file has not been altered).
What it means for a buyer. Four checking tools confirm the property, but all four read the lab’s single model of the standard, so one modelling mistake would pass all four. A buyer would want the same rule checked in a model they wrote themselves.
Pair-by-pair coupling estimates overstate the worst case, in a model
- The lab’s own check re-runs the search and failed as it should when the stored minimum was made tighter.
- An earlier test that changed only the printed headline figure did not make it fail; the lab’s record calls that result inconclusive.
- No tool outside the lab grades this: the model, the search and the check are all the lab’s own.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted, because the lab’s saved record of it no longer matches its signature (the stored mark that shows a file has not been altered).
What it means for a buyer. The lab’s check re-runs the whole search, and it failed as it should when the stored minimum was made tighter. The model, the search and the check are all the lab’s own; no outside tool grades this.
Tool combinations that leak a secret
- The lab’s own check re-runs the analysis and failed as it should on a deliberately broken input.
- The tools, the test world, the secret and the judge are all the lab’s own.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted, because the check rebuilds the file that holds the number each time it runs, which wipes out the change before the check reads it.
What it means for a buyer. The lab’s check re-runs the analysis, and it failed as it should on a deliberately broken input. The tools, the test world, the secret and the judge are all the lab’s own, so a buyer would want the same run on their own assistant’s tools.
Where deletion receipts can be fooled
- The lab’s own check re-runs the whole test campaign, in which the lab tries to fool both of its receipt checkers.
- To show that the check can fail, the lab changed one checker so that a step which should refuse a bad receipt accepted it, and the check failed, as it should.
- The check confirms only the campaign’s overall result, not each of the six ways the campaign shows a receipt can be fooled.
- Everything runs over an ordinary file in a simulation, and nobody outside the lab has graded it.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted, because the check rebuilds the file that holds the number each time it runs, which wipes out the change before the check reads it.
What it means for a buyer. The lab’s check re-runs the whole attempt to fool both receipt checkers, and it failed as it should when one checker was deliberately weakened. It confirms the overall result, not each failure mode one by one, and nobody outside the lab has graded it.
Signing off some tiles near a chip-mask edit, in simulation
- The lab’s own check confirms that the evidence file is unchanged and still carries the claim’s figure.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The check caught the change and failed, as it should.
- The check does not redo the point-by-point comparison.
- Another, longer command in the lab’s codebase does redo it, and nothing on this site runs that command.
- Everything is relative to the lab’s simulator, not to silicon.
What it means for a buyer. The lab’s check confirms that the evidence file is unchanged and still carries the claimed figure; the point-by-point comparison itself is redone by a longer command in the lab’s code, which this site does not run. Everything is relative to the lab’s simulator, so a buyer would want to re-run it on their own masks.
An automated attack search against quantum-safe Wi-Fi sign-in
- The lab’s own check re-runs the search.
- As a control, when the lab re-opened one known attack (KRACK, a key-reinstallation attack) in its models, the same search found an escape and the check failed as it should.
- The attacker, its list of moves and the verifier are all the lab’s own, and the target is the lab’s Python models, not real Wi-Fi software.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted, because the check rebuilds the file that holds the number each time it runs, which wipes out the change before the check reads it.
What it means for a buyer. As a control, when the lab re-opened one known attack (KRACK, a key-reinstallation attack) in its models, the same search found it, so the search found the one known attack the lab put back. The attacker, its moves and the models are all the lab’s own; it is not a test of real Wi-Fi software.
A memory ceiling for post-quantum Wi-Fi, proved in a model
- The Lean proof checker, a tool the lab did not write, confirms that the proof follows from the lab’s statement of the model.
- The lab’s own check was deliberately broken twice, with a doubled per-connection buffer and with a step of the proof left unfinished, and failed both times as it should.
- The Lean model is written by hand to mirror the Python code and nothing extracts it from the code.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted: the program could reach only one number, and the check kept passing even with the file that holds it emptied, so the check does not read that file.
What it means for a buyer. The Lean proof checker, a tool the lab did not write, confirms that the proof follows from the lab’s model. The model is written by hand to mirror the lab’s Python code, so a buyer would want the same cap checked against their own firmware.
The least bookkeeping a shared AI cache needs, in a model
- The Lean proof checker, a tool the lab did not write, confirms that the proof follows from the lab’s statement of the cache model.
- It does not check that the statement matches any real cache’s permission rule.
- The lab’s own deliberately broken copy changed only a worked example, not the general theorem, so it does not show whether a change to the theorem itself would be caught.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- That test could not be run for this result, because the program found no number in the claim that it could change.
What it means for a buyer. The Lean proof checker, a tool the lab did not write, confirms that the proof follows from the lab’s model of the cache. Nothing checks that the model matches a real cache’s permission rules.
A near-constant-size sign-off record for a photomask
- The lab’s own check re-hashes the two files it cites and confirms that the claim’s figures appear in them; it does not rebuild or re-verify a record.
- It failed as it should when a figure was changed.
- Another, longer command rebuilds the record.
- No tool outside the lab is involved.
- The lab also tried to break its own check on purpose.
- It had a separate program, one that did not build this result and could not see what the check expects, change a number the check reads, to see whether the check would notice.
- The result of that test cannot be counted, because the lab’s saved record of it no longer matches its signature (the stored mark that shows a file has not been altered).
What it means for a buyer. The lab’s check confirms that the two files it cites carry the claimed figures; it does not rebuild the record, and no tool outside the lab is involved.
Check a result file yourself
Do not trust our marketing. Drag and drop a .json certificate or receipt below to verify our claims locally in your browser. No network requests are made.
$ Drop a .json certificate or receipt anywhere on this panel.
SHA-256 runs in WebAssembly in this tab. Every published file and all 63 theorem names are already on the page.
Artifacts & Open Source
102open artifacts published: 76 GitHub repositories, 14 Hugging Face datasets, 12 Hugging Face Spaces
- Datasetcve-proof-corpus Real vulnerability classes, each with a machine-checkable proof that the shipped fix eliminates it.huggingface.co/datasets/nickh007/cve-proof-corpus
- LiveLattice Graph live API A production materials API; its health is public.api.latticegraph.com/v1/health
- Codepqc-bounds-lean A machine-checked post-quantum memory bound in Lean 4.github.com/nickharris808/pqc-bounds-lean
- Packagelatticegraph (PyPI) pip install latticegraph — the Lattice Graph client.
- Codecertkit A certificate format for machine-checked program admission, with an independent checker.
- Codecertkit-js An independent JavaScript checker for certkit certificates — runs in the browser.
- Codeformal-proof-mcp A server for AI agents (Model Context Protocol): it checks every proof step and reports any step left unproved.
- Codeinterval-core Validated interval arithmetic with directed outward rounding.
- Codekvleak Cross-tenant KV-cache leak scanner.
- Codesoundnessbench A public benchmark of vulnerable and fixed programs, with the baseline we published beside it.
- Codepqc-mfb The Post-Quantum Migration Failure Benchmark: executed cases grouped into failure families.
- Datasetkv-tenant-isolation-bench Cross-tenant KV-cache reuse measured on real serving stacks: the leak, its closure, the timing oracle and a replication.
- Datasetpqc-formal-corpus Named formal results from a post-quantum verification effort.
- Datasetprotocol-bench Published IEEE 802.11 / 3GPP procedures with ground-truth safety verdicts.
- Datasetscreening-ceiling Coupling-extraction screening data, and the layouts where a plausible extractor predicts physics that cannot happen.
- Spacecert-verifier (HF Space) Verify a manufacturing certificate in your browser. Nothing is uploaded.
- Spacepqc-explorer (HF Space) Is your post-quantum reassembly cap safe? One click.
- Spacephysics-lint (HF Space) Not linked: the lab's own record says this Space has never worked.
Read from the Hugging Face and GitHub APIs when this page was built.
Open source, by company
ChipletOS
- Codeinterval-core Validated interval arithmetic with directed outward rounding. Linked from Pair-by-pair coupling estimates overstate the worst case, in a model.
- Datasetscreening-ceiling Coupling-extraction screening data, and the layouts where a plausible extractor predicts physics that cannot happen.
- Spacephysics-lint Not linked: the lab’s own record says this Space has never worked.
- Datasetcert-atlas Proof-carrying chip-design artifacts that look valid and are not, with a two-sided score for any checker.
- Spacecert-verifier Verify a certificate in your browser. Nothing is uploaded.
- Datasethw-verify Hardware-security verification data: every positive example beside a deliberately broken counterpart.
- Datasethw-verify-paths Dependency graphs and paths for constant-time chip-logic analysis.
- Spacehw-verify A constant-time Verilog checker, in your browser.
- Spacehw-verify-site Prove what your hardware leaks, and refuse to guess.
OrbitalProof
- Codepqc-bounds-lean A machine-checked post-quantum memory bound, in the Lean proof assistant. Linked from A memory ceiling for post-quantum Wi-Fi, proved in a model.
- Spacepqc-explorer Is your post-quantum reassembly cap safe? One click. Linked from A memory ceiling for post-quantum Wi-Fi, proved in a model.
- Codepqc-mfb The Post-Quantum Migration Failure Benchmark.
- Datasetpqc-mfb Executed cases of how post-quantum migrations of key exchange fail.
- Datasetpqc-formal-corpus Named formal results from a post-quantum verification effort.
- Datasetprotocol-bench Published Wi-Fi and mobile-network procedures with ground-truth safety verdicts.
- Spaceprotocol-bench-demo Run a model checker in your browser.
- Datasetspecforge A verification benchmark of protocol-shaped state machines that cannot be memorised.
- Spacespecforge-leaderboard Score a solver with every counterexample replayed.
- Codecertkit A certificate format for machine-checked program admission, with an independent checker.
- Codecertkit-js An independent JavaScript checker for certkit certificates, in the browser.
- Spacecertkit-demo Verify safety proofs in the browser, and watch a forgery be refused.
- Codesoundnessbench A public benchmark of vulnerable and fixed programs, with the baseline published beside it.
- Spacesoundnessbench-leaderboard Score a soundness tool in your own browser.
- Datasetcve-proof-corpus Real vulnerability classes, each with a machine-checkable proof that the shipped fix eliminates it.
AxiomLimit
- Codekvleak A cross-tenant KV-cache leak scanner.
- Datasetkv-tenant-isolation-bench Every cross-tenant KV-cache observation on real serving stacks, including the ones that refute us.
- Spacetenant-leak-demo A cross-tenant cache leak, shown in the browser.
- Datasetkv-reuse-econ-traces KV-cache reuse accounting per workload, beside the closed form that predicts it.
- Datasetllm-precision-fingerprints Precision-labelled model outputs, with a built-in negative control.
Lattice Graph
- LiveLattice Graph live API A production materials API; its health is public.
- Packagelatticegraph pip install latticegraph: the Lattice Graph client.
The lab itself
- Codeformal-proof-mcp A server for AI agents (Model Context Protocol) that checks every proof step and reports any step left unproved.
- Datasetabstain-corpus Inputs a verifier must not pass.
- Spacenegative-results-atlas An atlas of negative results.
- Spacewait-for-visualiser A wait-for graph visualiser for deadlocks.
Intellectual Property
Each row is one technology area of one company, with the claims drafted in it, counted from the company’s own documents. A company’s claims are added up only beside the rows they add up, and this page adds nothing across companies.
By company: each technology area, the patent claims drafted for it, and how it was checked
| Company | Technology Genus | Claims drafted | Validation Engines |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChipletOS4 technology areas · 1,212 claims drafted | |||
| ChipletOS | Certified signoff for chiplet interconnects: proving where pairwise extraction fails, synthesizing isolation structures, and releasing a design to fabrication only on the proof | 444 claims drafted | Interval branch-and-bound proofs · Lean 4 · Z3 · our boundary-element solver · FastCap and Palace (independent field solvers) |
| ChipletOS | Certified admission of machine-generated lithography masks — producing, composing, bounding and independently checking the certificates | 382 claims drafted | Interval enclosures · Lean 4 · moment/SOS relaxations · RISC Zero STARK · DRAT proof checking |
| ChipletOS | Confidential verification: proving a chip's security, correctness and performance to a party who never receives the design | 331 claims drafted | Lean 4 (bv_decide) · CaDiCaL + drat-trim · CakeML-verified proof checker · Z3 · RISC Zero STARK receipts |
| ChipletOS | Glass-core interposers: through-glass-via design, CTE-matched via fill, pad transitions, design rules, thermal impedance and yield | 55 claims drafted | Boundary-element impedance extraction · Lamé stress analysis · Coffin-Manson fatigue · Monte Carlo yield |
| FluxZero4 technology areas · 228 claims drafted | |||
| FluxZero | Self-pumping (Marangoni) two-phase immersion coolant designs (modeled, not measured) | 120 claims drafted | Molecular dynamics · published fluid property data |
| FluxZero | Computational discovery of thermal-management fluids by molecular simulation and machine learning | 50 claims drafted | Molecular dynamics · machine-learning property models |
| FluxZero | Two-phase immersion coolant designs: an alkane fuel with a polar aprotic pump (modeled, not measured) | 58 claims drafted | Molecular dynamics · Hansen solubility screen · published fluid property data |
| FluxZero | Two-phase immersion coolant designs: the fuel-plus-pump family and the discovery engine (modeled, not measured)built from the three documents above and other sources, so not added to the total | 143 claims drafted | Molecular dynamics (GROMACS) · Monte-Carlo heat-flux model · multi-objective screen of two-component blends · Hansen solubility |
| OrbitalProof13 technology areas · 970 claims drafted Patent pending. | |||
| OrbitalProof | Post-quantum and verified wireless: a verification-gate genus for Wi-Fi, 5G and machine-interconnect links — freshness-gated handover, single-radio retune scheduling, loss-budget tokens, bounded-state post-quantum handshakes, ordered delivery, converse-gated compliance oracles and deterministic networking (39 claim groups) | 394 claims drafted | Lean 4 proofs, explicit-state model checking, exact converse computations |
| OrbitalProof | Post-quantum Wi-Fi key-management safety envelope — master claim (machine-checked bounded admission) | 2 claims drafted | Lean 4, TLA+ model checking (TLC) |
| OrbitalProof | Transition-mode downgrade firewall for post-quantum Wi-Fi | 18 claims drafted | reproduced attack matrix; Linux Wi-Fi simulator captures |
| OrbitalProof | Retransmission-safe key-install gate (install once per install ID) | 18 claims drafted | bounded model checking; Linux Wi-Fi simulator captures (naive reinstall vs repaired) |
| OrbitalProof | Fragmentation-safe post-quantum transcript root | 18 claims drafted | reproduced attack matrix; Linux Wi-Fi simulator captures (tampered fragment accepted vs aborted) |
| OrbitalProof | Adaptive post-quantum anti-clogging gate | 14 claims drafted | TLA+ model checking (TLC) |
| OrbitalProof | Post-quantum fast-roaming continuity epoch | 13 claims drafted | TLA+ model checking (TLC) |
| OrbitalProof | Transcript-bound anti-clogging puzzle | 17 claims drafted | TLA+ model checking (TLC); reproduced attack matrix |
| OrbitalProof | Wi-Fi integration of a post-quantum password-authenticated key exchange | 17 claims drafted | TLA+ model checking (TLC); reproduced attack matrix (the exchange primitive itself is prior art) |
| OrbitalProof | Multi-link post-quantum per-link key hierarchy | 18 claims drafted | TLA+ model checking (TLC), Z3; attack matrix; Linux Wi-Fi simulator captures |
| OrbitalProof | Pre-association beacon and management-frame post-quantum authenticity | 18 claims drafted | TLA+ model checking (TLC), Z3; attack matrix; Linux Wi-Fi simulator captures |
| OrbitalProof | Device-class and battery-aware policy binding to the handshake transcript | 16 claims drafted | TLC model checking, Z3; attack matrix |
| OrbitalProof | Proof-carrying admission of machine-generated code: certificate-gated patches, kernel programs and compiler passes, plus decoder-normative video bitstream syntax (39 claim groups) | 407 claims drafted | Farkas certificates re-checked by independent checkers; Lean 4, Z3, cvc5, CBMC, Kani, Frama-C cross-checks |
| AxiomLimit1 technology area · 727 claims drafted Patent pending. | |||
| AxiomLimit | Proof-carrying admission for AI inference infrastructure: tenant-rights capability engines and partition-key binding for shared KV caches, cross-instance reuse, memory zeroization, exactly-once state migration, and interconnect, power and scheduling admission gates (2 genera, 87 mechanism groups) | 727 claims drafted | Lean 4 proofs, CP-SAT optimality certificates, live-GPU reproductions |
| Lattice Graph8 technology areas · 1,191 claims drafted | |||
| Lattice Graph | Solid-state electrolytes and battery materials | 173 claims drafted | MACE-MP-0 and CHGNet phonons · ab initio molecular dynamics · public DFT data (Materials Project, OQMD) · USPTO landscape |
| Lattice Graph | Glass-core packaging: glass substrates, through-glass-via barriers, low-k redistribution layers, thermal interfaces, radiation-hard glass | 239 claims drafted | MACE-MP-0 phonons · GlassNet glass-property model · DFPT and hybrid-functional DFT · USPTO landscape |
| Lattice Graph | Photovoltaic and optoelectronic absorbers, transparent conductors and detectors | 135 claims drafted | PBE and HSE band structures · DFPT · MACE-MP-0 phonons · ALIGNN property models · public DFT data (Materials Project, JARVIS) |
| Lattice Graph | Catalysts and photocatalysts for hydrogen and oxygen evolution | 102 claims drafted | Quantum ESPRESSO DFT · DFPT · MACE-MP-0 phonons · public DFT data (Materials Project, JARVIS) |
| Lattice Graph | Dielectrics, ferroelectrics, piezoelectrics, multiferroics and microwave ceramics | 144 claims drafted | DFPT dielectric and piezoelectric tensors · PBE DFT · MACE-MP-0 phonons · JARVIS data |
| Lattice Graph | Thermoelectrics, magnets and topological materials | 98 claims drafted | MACE-MP-0 phonons · phono3py lattice thermal conductivity · PBE DFT · Materials Project data |
| Lattice Graph | Computational discovery methods: substitution, whitespace, DFT disagreement, supply-risk tiers | 152 claims drafted | cross-database DFT comparison (Materials Project, JARVIS, OQMD) · patent-landscape triangulation · the live warehouse |
| Lattice Graph | Other compositions: chiral, synthesis, superhard, 2-D, fluoride, etch, fuel-cell, power-substrate and multi-use | 148 claims drafted | MACE-MP-0 phonons · PBE and HSE DFT · DFPT · Materials Project data |
Limits and disclosures
- Chip, lithography and materials results are simulations, solvers and proofs. We claim 0 fab or laboratory measurements.
- Lean 4 certifies the mathematics as stated; whether a model matches the physical system is established separately, by simulation or measurement.
- No customer, no revenue, no pilot, no third-party audit. Today's independent checks are Lean 4, Z3, OR-Tools CP-SAT and NIST's own test vectors, not outside organizations.
- An engineering cycle is proven only as far as its own proof command checks, and no further.
- Of 333 results the portfolio's codebases have put forward, 199 were taken back by the codebase that made them and 0 were never stated as true at all.
- 134 are still stated as true by the codebase that made them; 101 of those also have no headline figure their own codebase records as checked by nothing; 7 went red when someone outside that codebase, inside the lab's programme, broke their input on purpose; not every one of those is a result published on this site, and the count includes a result held from publication for now, which is counted but not named. Every count above the 7 is a codebase grading its own work, and no outside organisation has audited any of it.
- The 11,200-attack search ran on a fixed budget: zero escapes is a null result, not a proof that none exist.
- No patent has been granted.
How we show numbers
Every number on this site links to the file it comes from. How each result is checked
- We never show a number before its file has loaded.
- A question we have not checked yet is marked as unchecked.
- A check that found nothing says so.
- A file with no value for a question says so.
- A number whose file is missing or has changed is not shown.
- Two files that disagree about what a number describes are both flagged.
- A number from too few samples shows its sample size.
- Two files that give different values are both shown.
- A file we cannot publish is listed by its fingerprint only.
- A measurement more than a week old shows its age.
- A question that does not apply to a page is left off it.
- A measurement whose program failed is shown as failed.